Fix and expand §1.3 — on-disk identity format (real spec bug!)

Closes Tier 1 #6 and the entire Tier 1 sweep. Previous §1.3 said the
on-disk byte order was Ed25519_priv(32) || X25519_priv(32) ("opposite
of the public_key concatenation"). That was WRONG.

Verified empirically against RNS 1.2.0 by round-tripping the existing
test vectors through Identity.to_file and reading the bytes back:

    disk = X25519_priv(32) || Ed25519_priv(32)    # same as public_key

This matches Identity.get_private_key() at RNS/Identity.py:694-698:
   return self.prv_bytes + self.sig_prv_bytes
where prv_bytes is X25519 (line 679) and sig_prv_bytes is Ed25519
(line 682). It also matches load_private_key at line 706-717.

Implementations following the prior spec wording would have written
identity files that fail to load on upstream RNS — a real interop
break that would have been very hard to debug because the failure is
in keypair-loading, before any signature operation runs.

§1.3 rewritten and expanded:

  - Correct byte order with citation to upstream code.
  - 64-byte raw-blob format with explicit "no header / no version /
    no checksum / no encryption".
  - File-system facts: no chmod, expected to live in OS-protected
    storage, filename is caller-controlled.
  - from_bytes HAZARD note: feeding raw random bytes skips the
    `cryptography` library's keypair-generation invariants
    (X25519 RFC 7748 §5 scalar clamping etc).
  - Cross-implementation portability follows automatically because
    there's nothing in the file but the bytes.
  - ⚠️ Spec correction callout warning future readers about the
    previous wording so the bug history is on record.

tools/verify_destination_hash.py extended with a §1.3 to_file /
from_file round-trip section. For each test vector it now:
  - writes the identity via to_file
  - asserts the on-disk file is exactly 64 bytes
  - asserts disk[:32] hex == expected x25519_priv_hex
  - asserts disk[32:64] hex == expected ed25519_priv_hex
  - reloads via from_file and asserts identity_hash invariance

This is what would have caught the bug if it had been there from the
start. tools/README.md updated to reflect §1.3 coverage.

Cumulative Tier 1 status: 6 of 6 done. A from-scratch client built
from §1-§9 + §10 + §11 + flows/ can now interop with upstream
Reticulum / LXMF / RNode for identity, announce, opportunistic LXMF
DATA, Resource fragmentation, regular PROOF receipts, link
handshakes with MTU/mode signalling, path-? discovery, and
KISS/HDLC/RNode-air-frame framing. Tiers 2 and 3 remain open in the
todo for follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

SPEC.md

@@ -50,7 +50,50 @@ Common pre-computed `name_hash` values:
 
 ### 1.3 Private key on-disk format
 
-The Python serializer writes private-key bytes as `Ed25519_priv(32) || X25519_priv(32)` — Ed25519 first, X25519 second. This is the **opposite** of the public_key concatenation order (`RNS/Identity.py:from_file` and `to_file`). Implementations that store/load identities to disk in a Python-compatible format must respect this.
+`RNS.Identity.to_file(path)` writes the raw 64-byte private-key blob with **no header, no version byte, no checksum, no encryption**. The byte order is the **same** as the public_key concatenation in §1.1 — verified by `tools/verify_destination_hash.py`'s existing `Identity.from_bytes` round-trip:
+
+```
+prv_bytes_blob  =  X25519_priv(32) || Ed25519_priv(32)         // 64 bytes total
+```
+
+`Identity.get_private_key()` at `RNS/Identity.py:694-698` returns this exact concatenation:
+
+```python
+def get_private_key(self):
+    return self.prv_bytes + self.sig_prv_bytes
+    #      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^   X25519 priv (set at line 679 from X25519PrivateKey.generate())
+    #                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^   Ed25519 priv (set at line 682)
+```
+
+`Identity.load_private_key(prv_bytes)` at line 706-717 slices it back the same way:
+
+```python
+self.prv_bytes     = prv_bytes[:32]   # X25519
+self.sig_prv_bytes = prv_bytes[32:]   # Ed25519
+```
+
+`to_file` is a thin wrapper that writes `get_private_key()` to the path; `from_file` reads back with no extra parsing.
+
+#### File-system facts
+
+- **Size:** exactly 64 bytes. No magic, no length prefix.
+- **Encryption:** none. Anyone with read access can fully impersonate the identity.
+- **Permissions:** upstream doesn't `chmod` the file; clients are expected to put it in a directory protected by OS permissions (`~/.reticulum/storage` on Linux/macOS, `%APPDATA%/Reticulum/storage` on Windows by default).
+- **Filename:** caller-controlled. RNS itself uses `transport_identity` for the transport node and lets app-level callers choose for delivery destinations (LXMF puts these in `LXMF.LXMRouter.storagepath`).
+
+#### Constructing from raw bytes — `from_bytes` HAZARD
+
+`Identity.from_bytes(prv_bytes)` at line 611-623 takes the same 64-byte concat and reconstitutes an `Identity`. The upstream docstring explicitly warns:
+
+> **HAZARD!** Never use this to generate a new key by feeding random data in prv_bytes.
+
+The reason: `X25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes` and `Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes` both accept arbitrary 32-byte values without scalar clamping or rejection — a clean-room implementation that feeds raw random data into `from_bytes` skips the keypair-generation invariants enforced by the upstream `cryptography` library's `.generate()` methods (e.g. X25519 scalar clamping per RFC 7748 §5). Always generate fresh keys via the `cryptography` (or equivalent) library's keypair generator, then concatenate; never invent your own bytes.
+
+#### Cross-implementation portability
+
+The format is portable across implementations because there's nothing in it but the raw bytes. A 64-byte file written by Python RNS is byte-identical to one written by any clean-room implementation that follows this section, and both produce the same `identity_hash` and `lxmf.delivery` `destination_hash` when fed back through §1.1 and §1.2 — test vectors at [`test-vectors/identities.json`](test-vectors/identities.json) demonstrate the round-trip against RNS 1.2.0.
+
+> ⚠️ **Spec correction:** Earlier revisions of this section described the on-disk order as Ed25519 first, X25519 second ("opposite of the public_key concatenation"). That was wrong — verified by re-running `Identity.to_file` and reading back the bytes against the test vector at `test-vectors/identities.json`, the actual order is X25519 first, Ed25519 second, identical to the public_key order. Implementations following the prior spec wording would have corrupted identity files when interoperating with upstream Python RNS.
 
 ---
 

todo.md

@@ -204,11 +204,25 @@ re-research.
       summary. `flows/path-discovery.md` walks the 9-step chronology
       with two wire-byte ladders (single-hop leaf-owns-target and
       two-hop transit-relay-knows-path).
-- [ ] **SPEC.md §1.3 expansion: identity on-disk format.** §1.3 names
-      the byte order (Ed25519 first, X25519 second, opposite of the
-      public-key concat) but not the file structure. `RNS/Identity.py::to_file`
-      is the reference. Without this, identities can't be exported /
-      imported across implementations.
+- [x] **SPEC.md §1.3 expansion: identity on-disk format.** Done — and
+      the previous wording was actually wrong about the byte order!
+      Empirically verified by reading `Identity.get_private_key()` at
+      `RNS/Identity.py:694-698` and `load_private_key` at line 706-717,
+      then round-tripping `to_file(path)` and reading back the bytes
+      against `test-vectors/identities.json`: the on-disk order is
+      X25519_priv(32) || Ed25519_priv(32), **same** as the public_key
+      concatenation, NOT opposite as the previous spec text claimed.
+      Implementations following the prior wording would have corrupted
+      identity files when interoperating with upstream Python RNS.
+      §1.3 now covers: 64-byte raw blob with no header/version/checksum/
+      encryption; the from_bytes HAZARD note (raw random bytes skip the
+      `cryptography` library's keypair invariants); cross-implementation
+      portability is automatic since there's nothing in the file but
+      the bytes; a ⚠️ "Spec correction" callout warning future readers
+      that prior revisions had this wrong. `tools/verify_destination_hash.py`
+      gets a new §1.3 round-trip section that writes via `to_file`,
+      reads back, asserts the byte slice matches the test vector, and
+      reloads via `from_file` to confirm identity_hash invariance.
 
 ### Tier 2 — required for a client to be useful in the wild
 

tools/README.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Populated against RNS 1.2.0 / LXMF 0.9.6:
 
 | Script | Verifies SPEC.md section | Status |
 |---|---|---|
-| `verify_destination_hash.py` | §1.1, §1.2 — identity composition + `dest_hash = SHA256(name_hash \|\| identity_hash)[:16]` | ✅ |
+| `verify_destination_hash.py` | §1.1, §1.2, §1.3 — identity composition, `dest_hash = SHA256(name_hash \|\| identity_hash)[:16]`, on-disk private-key round-trip via `to_file`/`from_file` | ✅ |
 | `verify_packet_header.py` | §2.1, §2.2, §2.3 — flag byte layout, HEADER_1/HEADER_2 form, originator HEADER_1→HEADER_2 conversion via upstream `Transport.outbound` | ✅ |
 | `verify_announce_app_data.py` | §4.3 — LXMF announce app_data 2-element form, parser tolerance | ✅ |
 | `verify_path_request.py` | §1.2 well-known hashes, §7.1 LXMF path-preamble gating | ✅ |

tools/verify_destination_hash.py

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 """
-Verifier for SPEC.md S1.1 (identity composition) and S1.2 (destination hash).
+Verifier for SPEC.md S1.1, S1.2, S1.3.
 
 Reads test-vectors/identities.json and, for each vector:
   - Loads the private-key bytes via RNS.Identity.from_bytes (the upstream API
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ Reads test-vectors/identities.json and, for each vector:
     expected.destination_hash_hex.
   - Cross-checks RNS.Destination.hash(identity_hash, *name.split(".")) ==
     expected.destination_hash_hex (i.e. upstream agrees with the by-hand recipe).
+  - S1.3 round-trip: writes the identity via `to_file`, reads the bytes back
+    from disk, confirms they are exactly the 64-byte X25519||Ed25519 concat
+    with no header / version byte / checksum / encryption, then loads via
+    `from_file` and confirms the resulting identity hash matches the original.
 
 Exit code 0 on PASS, non-zero on FAIL.
 """
@@ -22,6 +26,7 @@ import hashlib
 import json
 import os
 import sys
+import tempfile
 
 import RNS
 
@@ -77,7 +82,42 @@ def verify_vector(v: dict) -> None:
              f"  RNS.Destination.hash: {rns_dest_hash.hex()}\n"
              f"  want:                 {expect['destination_hash_hex']}")
 
-    print(f"PASS {label}: identity, identity_hash, dest_hash for {full!r}")
+    # S1.3: to_file / from_file round-trip + on-disk byte-order verification
+    fp = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False)
+    fp.close()
+    try:
+        if not identity.to_file(fp.name):
+            fail(f"{label}: Identity.to_file returned False")
+
+        with open(fp.name, "rb") as fh:
+            disk = fh.read()
+
+        if len(disk) != 64:
+            fail(f"{label}: on-disk identity is {len(disk)} bytes, want 64 (no header/checksum)")
+
+        # Per S1.3 the on-disk order is X25519_priv(32) || Ed25519_priv(32)
+        if disk[:32].hex() != inputs["x25519_priv_hex"]:
+            fail(f"{label}: on-disk bytes [0:32] != X25519 priv\n"
+                 f"  got:  {disk[:32].hex()}\n"
+                 f"  want: {inputs['x25519_priv_hex']}")
+        if disk[32:].hex() != inputs["ed25519_priv_hex"]:
+            fail(f"{label}: on-disk bytes [32:64] != Ed25519 priv\n"
+                 f"  got:  {disk[32:].hex()}\n"
+                 f"  want: {inputs['ed25519_priv_hex']}")
+
+        # from_file must reconstitute the same identity_hash
+        reloaded = RNS.Identity.from_file(fp.name)
+        if reloaded is None:
+            fail(f"{label}: Identity.from_file returned None")
+        if reloaded.hash.hex() != expect["identity_hash_hex"]:
+            fail(f"{label}: from_file identity hash mismatch\n"
+                 f"  got:  {reloaded.hash.hex()}\n"
+                 f"  want: {expect['identity_hash_hex']}")
+    finally:
+        os.unlink(fp.name)
+
+    print(f"PASS {label}: identity, identity_hash, dest_hash, "
+          "on-disk round-trip for {!r}".format(full))
 
 
 def main():