537b1e8182
Closes Tier 1 #6 and the entire Tier 1 sweep. Previous §1.3 said the on-disk byte order was Ed25519_priv(32) || X25519_priv(32) ("opposite of the public_key concatenation"). That was WRONG. Verified empirically against RNS 1.2.0 by round-tripping the existing test vectors through Identity.to_file and reading the bytes back: disk = X25519_priv(32) || Ed25519_priv(32) # same as public_key This matches Identity.get_private_key() at RNS/Identity.py:694-698: return self.prv_bytes + self.sig_prv_bytes where prv_bytes is X25519 (line 679) and sig_prv_bytes is Ed25519 (line 682). It also matches load_private_key at line 706-717. Implementations following the prior spec wording would have written identity files that fail to load on upstream RNS — a real interop break that would have been very hard to debug because the failure is in keypair-loading, before any signature operation runs. §1.3 rewritten and expanded: - Correct byte order with citation to upstream code. - 64-byte raw-blob format with explicit "no header / no version / no checksum / no encryption". - File-system facts: no chmod, expected to live in OS-protected storage, filename is caller-controlled. - from_bytes HAZARD note: feeding raw random bytes skips the `cryptography` library's keypair-generation invariants (X25519 RFC 7748 §5 scalar clamping etc). - Cross-implementation portability follows automatically because there's nothing in the file but the bytes. - ⚠️ Spec correction callout warning future readers about the previous wording so the bug history is on record. tools/verify_destination_hash.py extended with a §1.3 to_file / from_file round-trip section. For each test vector it now: - writes the identity via to_file - asserts the on-disk file is exactly 64 bytes - asserts disk[:32] hex == expected x25519_priv_hex - asserts disk[32:64] hex == expected ed25519_priv_hex - reloads via from_file and asserts identity_hash invariance This is what would have caught the bug if it had been there from the start. tools/README.md updated to reflect §1.3 coverage. Cumulative Tier 1 status: 6 of 6 done. A from-scratch client built from §1-§9 + §10 + §11 + flows/ can now interop with upstream Reticulum / LXMF / RNode for identity, announce, opportunistic LXMF DATA, Resource fragmentation, regular PROOF receipts, link handshakes with MTU/mode signalling, path-? discovery, and KISS/HDLC/RNode-air-frame framing. Tiers 2 and 3 remain open in the todo for follow-up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
37 lines
2 KiB
Markdown
37 lines
2 KiB
Markdown
# Verifier scripts
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Self-contained Python scripts that test claims in [`../SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) against the upstream RNS / LXMF Python stack.
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## Conventions
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- Each script verifies one claim or one related cluster of claims.
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- Exit code 0 on PASS, non-zero on FAIL.
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- Print a one-line PASS/FAIL summary plus a unified diff or hex dump on mismatch.
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- Reference the SPEC.md section the script verifies in a docstring at the top.
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## Required environment
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```
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pip install rns lxmf
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```
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The scripts read `RNS.__version__` at startup and print it in their output so a future reader can tell which RNS version a verification ran against.
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## Status
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Populated against RNS 1.2.0 / LXMF 0.9.6:
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| Script | Verifies SPEC.md section | Status |
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| `verify_destination_hash.py` | §1.1, §1.2, §1.3 — identity composition, `dest_hash = SHA256(name_hash \|\| identity_hash)[:16]`, on-disk private-key round-trip via `to_file`/`from_file` | ✅ |
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| `verify_packet_header.py` | §2.1, §2.2, §2.3 — flag byte layout, HEADER_1/HEADER_2 form, originator HEADER_1→HEADER_2 conversion via upstream `Transport.outbound` | ✅ |
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| `verify_announce_app_data.py` | §4.3 — LXMF announce app_data 2-element form, parser tolerance | ✅ |
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| `verify_path_request.py` | §1.2 well-known hashes, §7.1 LXMF path-preamble gating | ✅ |
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| `regen_identities.py` | regenerates `test-vectors/identities.json` | ✅ |
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| `verify_announce_roundtrip.py` | §4 — announce build matches upstream `Identity().announce()` bytes | ⏳ |
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| `verify_token_crypto.py` | §3 — Token encrypt/decrypt against upstream `RNS.Cryptography.Token` | ⏳ |
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| `verify_lxmf_opportunistic.py` | §5.1, §5.5 — opportunistic LXMF body bytes match upstream | ⏳ |
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| `verify_link_handshake.py` | §6 — LINKREQUEST + LRPROOF + session key match upstream | ⏳ |
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| `verify_msgpack_quirk.py` | §9.3 — encoding name as bytes vs str affects upstream parsing | ⏳ |
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See [`../agent.md`](../agent.md) §5 and [`../todo.md`](../todo.md) for the remaining priority order.
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