John Poole
7ffbb0ef5e
Tier 1 audit: `link-lxmf-tier1-rns-1.2.4-lxmf-0.9.7.md` Tier 2 vectors/verifier: link-lxmf.json, regen_link_lxmf.py, and verify_link_lxmf.py Tier 3 promotion: updated SPEC.md, flows, status, and documentation Key correction: the 319/320 boundary uses upstream’s computed LXMF content_size, not simply raw message content length. Also corrected stale flow descriptions for KEEPALIVE (0xFA) and encrypted LINKCLOSE teardown (0xFC). Verification: Deterministic vector regeneration: identical SHA-256 Portable-path and formatting checks: pass Full pinned suite: 17 passed, 0 failed
57 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
# Test vectors
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Known-good byte sequences that any Reticulum-compatible implementation should be able to round-trip in both directions.
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## Status
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Populated against RNS 1.2.4 / LXMF 0.9.7:
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- ✅ `identities.json` — Alice + Bob identity vectors (regenerator: `../tools/regen_identities.py`, verifier: `../tools/verify_destination_hash.py`).
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- ✅ `announces.json` — two announce vectors (no-ratchet + with-ratchet) signed by Alice (regenerator: `../tools/regen_announces.py`, verifier: `../tools/verify_announce_roundtrip.py`).
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- ✅ `lxmf.json` — two opportunistic-LXMF vectors Alice → Bob (regenerator: `../tools/regen_lxmf.py`, verifier: `../tools/verify_lxmf_opportunistic.py`).
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- ✅ `links.json` — full Link handshake vector (LINKREQUEST + LRPROOF + derived session key) Alice → Bob, plus an LRRTT packet (§6.4.2) emitted from the initiator with pinned IV and `rtt_seconds = 0.05` (regenerator: `../tools/regen_links.py`, verifiers: `../tools/verify_link_handshake.py`, `../tools/verify_link_lrrtt.py`).
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- ✅ `resources.json` — deterministic multi-part Resource ciphertext, part packets, hashmap, advertisement, and proof body (regenerator: `../tools/regen_resources.py`, verifier: `../tools/verify_resource.py`).
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- ✅ `link-lxmf.json` — DIRECT LXMF PACKET and Resource vectors at the exact 319/320 computed-content boundary (regenerator: `../tools/regen_link_lxmf.py`, verifier: `../tools/verify_link_lxmf.py`).
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All six files are byte-deterministic across runs: regenerators pin every random source (ephemeral keys, IVs, `random_hash` values, timestamps) so the output is reproducible against a fixed upstream RNS / LXMF version.
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See [`../agent.md`](../agent.md) §3 and [`../todo.md`](../todo.md) for the evidence model and remaining task list.
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## Format (proposed)
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Each vector lives in a per-domain JSON file, e.g.:
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- `identities.json` — Alice + Bob with `encPriv`, `sigPriv`, `ratchetPriv` (hex), plus the derived `publicKey`, `identityHash`, `destinationHash` for `lxmf.delivery`
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- `announces.json` — full hex of a signed announce packet, plus the inputs that produced it (display_name, ratchetPub, etc.)
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- `lxmf.json` — sender + recipient identity, plaintext, expected ciphertext bytes
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- `links.json` — LINKREQUEST + LRPROOF + derived session keys
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- `resources.json` — Resource plaintext, encrypted stream, parts, hashmap, advertisement, and proof
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- `link-lxmf.json` — DIRECT LXMF Link DATA and Resource boundary forms
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Each entry should include:
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```json
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{
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"description": "Alice's lxmf.delivery announce with ratchet, display_name='AliceTest'",
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"inputs": { ... },
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"expected_bytes_hex": "...",
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"rns_version_at_generation": "1.2.0",
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"generator_script": "tools/regen_announces.py"
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}
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```
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The `generator_script` is the file in `../tools/` that, when run against upstream RNS, regenerates `expected_bytes_hex`. Keeping the generator alongside the vector lets a future contributor verify the vector still matches a newer upstream RNS.
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## What needs to round-trip
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For the spec to claim "an implementation that passes all test vectors interoperates with upstream", the vectors must cover:
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1. **Identity construction** — given the same private-key inputs, derive the same public key, identity hash, destination hash.
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2. **Announce build + parse** — build a signed announce; verify the same bytes come back through upstream's parser; verify upstream-built announces parse correctly.
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3. **Token encrypt + decrypt** — bidirectional, with both ratchet and long-term keys.
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4. **Opportunistic LXMF** — full plaintext → ciphertext → plaintext round-trip, signature valid both ways.
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5. **Link handshake** — LINKREQUEST built by client A, LRPROOF computed by upstream as B, both arrive at the same `link_id` and session keys.
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6. **Link-delivered LXMF** — body packed by client, decrypted + parsed by upstream. Covered by `link-lxmf.json`.
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7. **Resource transfer** — encrypt once, split into parts, validate ADV/hashmap, assemble, and emit the expected proof.
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A separate vector set for FAILURE cases is also useful: malformed announces, expired ratchets, mismatched signatures. An implementation should reject those as a regression-prevention measure.
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